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SELECTION METHODOLOGY OF H-1 COMPONENTS 
AS POTENTIAL CANDIDATES FOR  
PERFORMANCE BASED LOGISTICS CONTRACTS 
 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this planned project is to devise a method to evaluate H-1 
components as possible candidates for Performance Based Logistics contracts.  The 
objectives of this project are: (1) provide an overview of the H-1 program; (2) provide an 
overview of Performance Based Logistics contracts for component support; and (3) 
explore methods of identifying components as PBL candidates specifically for the H-1 
community, through an analysis of readiness data, interviews with subject matter experts 
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The purpose of this study was to provide a background of the H-1 program and 
performance based logistics and to ultimately find a methodology that would enable 
contracting personnel to select components that are good candidates for PBL contracts 
within the H-1 program. 
The H-1 community has existed since the Vietnam era and the latest upgrade 
contract was issued in 1996.  Currently, DoD has a PBL contract with Bell Helicopter 
Textron, Inc.  PBL contracts are the preferred method of acquisition within DoD and 
currently there are PBL contracts on eleven part families containing twenty-one NSNs.  
However, there is no standard methodology used to select which components are used in 
PBL contracts. 
In order to determine which component was a good candidate for further 
exploration, the authors gathered data from NAVICP Philadelphia including reports 
listing the top ten NMC components.  The authors then looked at the NMCM, NMCS, 
DMMH, BCM, CANN and Support Cost categories to select the component for further 
evaluation.  The selected component is the dual hydraulic actuator. 
The authors used reports listing the removal hours on each of the dual hydraulic 
actuators.  The data was entered into a Crystal Ball model.  This model used the actual 
data to forecast the removal time for 10,000 of these parts.  Using the results from this 
model, in conjunction with knowledge and experience about the aircraft and this 
component, the authors were able to make conclusions regarding the dual hydraulic 
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I. H-1 HISTORY  
A.  PROGRAM HISTORY 
The H-1 community has existed since the Vietnam Era.  Several upgrades to the 
UH (Utility Helicopter) and AH (Attack Helicopter) models have been made throughout 
the years.  The current configurations of the UH and AH were initially fielded in 1970 
and 1986, respectively.  As these airframes reach the end of their service life, especially 
the UH-1N, they become increased logistic and maintenance burdens to the fleet.  
Specific problems include multiple modifications that negatively affect payload and 
power capabilities—problems that are magnified by the location of current operations in 
Iraq.  Based on the author’s observations while working as a Maintenance Material 
Control Officer, the modifications have also caused increased aircrew and maintainer 
workload. To address these issues, Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. was awarded the H-1 
Upgrade Program contract in 1996.  This contract marked the beginning of the H-1 
remanufacture initiative to drastically improve the aging UH and AH aircraft.  The 
following enhancements were identified as part of the upgrade initiative: 
• Improved mission capability 
• Increased performance and maneuverability 
• Additional survivability features 
• Reduced pilot workload 
• Potential for growth (Davidovich and Myers, n.d.) 
Additional improvements formed as requirements to meet the demands of future 
missions, which include: 
• Operations at greater ranges and with larger payloads 
• Command, control and communications interoperability 
• Expanded night and reduced visibility operations 
• Improved targeting sensors and weapons 
• Survivability enhancements (Davidovich and Myers, n.d.) 
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B. MISSION NEED 
The UH-1N and the AH-1W type model series aircraft make up the composition 
of the Marine Light Attack Helicopter (HML/A) Squadron.  The HML/A squadron's 
primary mission is to provide Close Air Support (CAS) to the Ground Combat Element 
(GCE); it also performs numerous supporting missions for the GCE and Air Combat 
Element (ACE).  These missions include but are not limited to: air reconnaissance, armed 
escort, search and target acquisition, and destruction of hardened and armored targets 
(PMA-276, AH-1W “Super Cobra,” n.d.).  In addition, the UH-1N utility helicopter 
provides a means for command and control and is capable of fulfilling medical 
evacuation, control and coordination for assault support operations, raids and tactical 
recovery of aircraft and personnel (PMA-276, UH-1N “Iroquois,” n.d.).  The UH-1Y and 
AH-1Z, the respective upgrades to the UH-1N and the AH-1W, will continue to perform 
these missions.  Improved capabilities will give these airframes longer on-station times 
and increase their payload, while extending the battle space beyond current boundaries. 
C. MAJOR REQUIREMENTS 
The H-1 Upgrade Program initially called for the remanufacture of 180 AH-1W 
and 100 UH-1N helicopters to an advanced configuration (AH-1W/AH-1Z Super Cobra, 
2008).  Remanufacturing efforts shifted focus following the induction of only seven AH-
1Ws and six UH-1Ns into the remanufacture program due to airframe unavailability.  
Operational commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan prevented deploying squadrons from 
losing airframes to the upgrade process.  Also, as of April 2005 a new cabin design and 
certain cost-related issues had made upgrade of the UH-1Ns to the UH-1Y configuration 
impractical.  These changes necessitated a switch from a re-manufacturing to a new 
product manufacturing approach for the UH-1Y.1 
Other major program requirements include a focus on providing 84 percent 
component commonality between the UH-1Y and AH-1Z, in order to drastically reduce 
their logistical footprint and facilitate easier maintenance for the HML/A maintainers 
                                                 
1 Mike Gauthier, telephone interview, 25 October 2007. 
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(PMA-276, UH-1N “Iroquois,” n.d.). The most significant upgrade to these Type Model 
Series (TMS) is to the rotor system.  The existing two-blade system is replaced by a new 
four-bladed, composite and ballistically tolerant rotor system (PMA-276, UH-1Y 
“Iroquois,” n.d.). Based on the author’s observations while working as a Maintenance 
Material Control Officer, other upgrades, such as threat detection and aversion equipment 
(countermeasure systems) on both airframes, are also critical in order to minimize loss of 
life in an ever-fluid battle space. 
Countermeasure improvements include such features as the turned exhaust, which 
drastically reduces the heat signature of the aircraft because the exhaust is deflected 
(turned) from heating up the tail boom.  This improvement was made to the AH-1W as a 
fit-forward initiative completed on all aircraft forward deployed to Iraq, and to all Marine 
Expeditionary Units (MEU) in 2006.  Other countermeasure improvements include radar 
warning systems and infrared countermeasure systems.  These modifications will broaden 
the capabilities of the HML/A community to provide effective CAS and will improve 
effectiveness of related support missions, while simultaneously providing safety from 
enemy weapons systems. 
D. TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS COMPARISONS 
Table 1 illustrates the technical characteristic improvements of the UH-1Y: 
 
Table 1.   UH-1 Improvement Comparison (From: PMA-276, UH-1N “Iroquois,” 
n.d.) 
 




Weight 10,500 lbs 18,500 lbs 76 
Max. Internal Fuel 1,360 lbs 2,584 lbs 90 
Maximum Speed 130 kts 198 kts 52 
Cruise Speed 107 kts 153 kts 43 
HOGE Useful Load 3,532 lbs 5,930 lbs 68 
Service Ceiling 17,300 feet 20,000 feet 16 
Mission Radius 110 nm 130 nm 15 
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The most significant improvement to the UH-1 is not illustrated in this table.  The 
T400 twin pack engines will now be replaced by two T700 engines.  The increased 
horsepower of the new engines provide much more output than the T400s.  The upgraded 
engines, in conjunction with the four-blade rotor system, will add to the lift capabilities of 
the Marine Corps utility helicopter.  Current operations in an arid, high-heat environment 
revealed a serious limitation of the UH-1N in achieving the necessary power to provide 
the appropriate lift upon take-off.  Often, the crew has to perform the same mission with 
less equipment and firepower in order to reduce the weight in compensation for less 
available lifting power. 
Table 2 illustrates the technical characteristic improvements of the AH-1Z: 
 
Table 2.   AH-1 Improvement Comparison (From: PMA-276, AH-1W “Super 
Cobra,” n.d.) 
AH Comparison AH-1W AH-1Z Percent Improvement 
Max. Gross 
Weight 14750 lbs 18,500 lbs 25 
Max. Internal Fuel 2100 lbs 2,768 lbs 32 
Maximum Speed 190 kts 222 kts 17 
Cruise Speed 131 kts 142 kts 8 
Service Ceiling 14,700 feet 20,000 feet 36 
Mission Radius 58 nm 128 nm 121 
 
An important characteristic that is not included in this chart is the length of the 
new stub-wings.  The AH-1Z, in comparison to its W predecessor will have longer, 
stronger stub-wings, allowing for additional weapons stores without having to track the 
carriage of Hellfire missiles.  On the AH-1W, an accounting process placed additional 
responsibility on maintenance administration personnel by requiring the aircrew to 
accurately document flight hours in which the missiles were on the wing.  This 
requirement surfaced because the AH-1W stub-wings developed cracks at the union of 




wings by a reduction ratio of six hours for every one hour of flight.  The new wings are 
designed to avoid that defect. Thus, the AH-1Z should also reduce the administrative 
overhead on the maintenance crews. 
E. PROGRAM PROGRESS 
The program has undergone several changes to both cost and schedule, and in 
addition was forced to shift from a remanufacture strategy to a new production strategy 
for the UH-1Y (Snakes and Rotors, 2008).  The Global War On Terror (GWOT) is the 
driver for the schedule changes, due to the commitments placed on the UH-1N and AH-
1W assets used abroad, while design considerations necessitated the strategy change for 
the UH-1Y. Other changes surfaced because the vendor (Bell) was not meeting the needs 
of the program.  Management changes were made within the company and the program 
schedule was revised to reach Initial Operation Capability (IOC) for the UH-1Ys in 
September 08.  However, IOC for the AH-1Z has been pushed back until fiscal year 
2011.  Despite the shift in the delivery schedule, four UH-1Y and three AH-1Z Lot 1 
aircraft were delivered to the fleet and are currently conducting final operational 
evaluation (OPEVAL) testing (Kerzner, 2007). 
F. MANAGEMENT ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 
1. GWOT 
The onset of the GWOT increased the requirements placed on fleet assets, 
resulting in fewer aircraft available for the induction process.  This increased demand for 
H-1 assets forward deployed is a primary reason why the IOC has shifted to the right. 
The GWOT has also placed a usage strain on the airframes/components by 
operating above the utilization rate the structures are designed to support.  Mission 
requirements in the GWOT place continual pressure on H-1 logisticians to increase 
operational availability (Ao).  However, continued operational tempo will likely cause 
additional strain on life-limited components, further negatively affecting the operational 
availability of these airframes. 
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2. Upgrades 
The UH-1Y cabin upgrade, which eliminated the remanufacture requirement 
altogether due to major structural changes with the new design, mandated an entire shift 
in strategy for that platform. The AH-1Z, however, has not completely abandoned the 
remanufacture process. 
3. Supportability 
The challenge that lies ahead for H-1 logisticians is to increase the Ao by 
addressing reliability and turn-around time of the repair parts on both airframes, while 
simultaneously facing increased operations and the fielding of the upgrade platforms.  
The answer from senior logisticians within the Department of Defense is Performance 
Based Logistics (PBL).  The H-1 community has taken the crawl, walk, run approach to 
PBL implementation as Performance Based Agreements (PBA) between the warfighter 
and the Program Manager are established. 
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II. PERFORMANCE BASED LOGISTICS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Performance Based Logistics (PBL) is an acquisition reform that is intended to 
improve weapon systems logistics by reducing cost, improving reliability and reducing 
footprint (Doerr, Eaton, and Lewis, 2004).  According to the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU), PBL is: 
The preferred sustainment strategy for weapon system product support 
that employs the purchase of support as an integrated, affordable 
performance package designed to optimize system readiness. PBL meets 
performance goals for a weapon system through a support structure based 
on long-term performance agreements with clear lines of authority and 
responsibility. (Defense Acquisition University, n.d.) 
The use of PBL within government has been mandated.  In a memorandum dated 
February 12, 2002 from the Under Secretary of Defense - Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, a mandate for use of PBL is outlined.  Below is an excerpt from that 
memorandum. 
On September 30, 2001, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 
mandated implementation of Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) and 
modern business systems with appropriate metrics to compress the supply 
chain, eliminate non-value-added steps, and improve readiness for major 
weapons systems and commodities.  PBL delineates outcome performance 
goals of weapon systems, ensures that responsibilities are assigned, 
provides incentives for attaining these goals and facilitates the overall life 
cycle management of system reliability, supportability, and total 
ownership costs. (Undersecretary of Defense, 2002) 
B. PERFORMANCE BASED LOGISTICS METRICS 
There are five overarching metrics for PBL: Logistics Response Time, Logistics 
Footprint, Cost Per Unit Usage, Operational Availability and Mission Reliability.  Mark 
Weston-Dawkes gave the following definitions and formulas in a presentation on 
September 26, 2006 (Weston-Dawkes, 2006). 
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1. Logistics Response Time 
Logistics Response Time (LRT) is the period of calendar time from when a 
failure/malfunction is detected and validated by the maintainer to the time that the 
failure/malfunction has been resolved.  This includes: the time from when a need is 
identified until the provider satisfies that need, all associated supply chain and 
maintenance time, and delivery time of parts.   
The formula for LRT is: (Date (or time) of satisfaction of the logistics demand) 
minus (date (or time) of issue of logistics demand). 
2. Logistics Footprint 
Logistics Footprint is the government/contractor size of logistics support required 
to deploy, sustain and move a weapon system for a given mission profile.  Measurable 
elements should include but not be limited to:  inventory/equipment, personnel, facilities, 
transportation assets, supply and real estate.  Measures should quantify the footprint (i.e. 
weight, area, volume and personnel, etc.) as appropriate. 
Logistics Footprint encompasses a wide variety of elements, so one specific 
formula cannot encompass the entire embodiment of logistics support.  However, each 
element can be quantified, measured, and assessed individually.  These individual 
assessments can then be integrated as an overarching logistics footprint analysis.  
Logistic Footprint is a function of various elements to include area (a), volume (v), 
weight (w), and support personnel (sp). 
3. Cost Per Unit Usage 
Cost Per Unit Usage is the total Operating and Support costs, to include overhead 






under established conditions.  Usage can be measured in terms of unit density or 
individual weapons system; usage factors include miles, rounds, launches, flight hours, 
time, systems, etc.  
The formula for Cost Per Unit Usage is (Total Operating and Support Costs) 
divided by (Miles/Rounds/Launches/Flight Hours, etc.). 
4. Operational Availability (Ao) 
Operational Availability is the percent of time that a weapon system is mission 
capable. 
There are two possible formulas for Ao.  Over any period of time, the directly 
measured Ao (post-fielding) is Ao=(Up Time) divided by (Up Time plus Down Time).  
The expected long-term, steady-state Ao (throughout the life cycle) is determined from 
the classic formula Ao=(Mean Time Between Failures) divided by (Mean Time Between 
Failures plus Mean Time To Recovery plus Mean Logistics Delay Time).  It is noted that 
preventive maintenance and standby time must not be ignored in overall assessment. 
5. Mission Reliability 
Mission reliability is the measure(s) or ability of a system to achieve Operational 
Performance (OP) for a defined mission or specified mission profile. 
The formula for Mission Reliability is (Number of successful missions) divided 
by (number of attempted missions).  There is an alternate use of the formula, which may 
be used where Mission Reliability success is best measured in terms where discrete 
mission success does not provide best meaning for the metric.  This is the formula where 
OP is measured as a percentage of Mission Duration.  Therefore, Mission Reliability is 




C. IMPLEMENTING PBL 
1. Transition to PBL 
The Department of Defense (DoD) and the Military Services are in the process of 
“transforming from traditional methods of logistics support to Performance-Based 
Logistics (PBL) as the methodology of product support for the 21st century” (Defense 
Contract Management Agency, 2002). According to the Performance Based Logistics 
(PBL) Support Guidebook issued by the Defense Contract Management Agency: 
Each PBL contract is hand crafted and will vary from other PBL contracts.  
PBL suppliers may take on a number of functions normally performed by 
various DoD services or agencies.  These functions may include 
determining spare parts requirements, physical distribution, warehousing 
of material, depot level maintenance, configuration management and some 
engineering functions. 
A PBL arrangement may take many forms.  There is no one-size-fits-all 
approach to PBL.  Arrangements may be made with industry partners 
supporting commercially available/military unique equipment or 
government activities supporting military unique equipment. Also industry 
partners may have government activities functioning as their vendors. 
(Defense Contract Management Agency, 2002) 
 











Performance Based Logistics 
PBL Arrangements Spectrum 
    Public/Private Partnership Legacy 
 
Figure 1.   PBL Arrangements Spectrum (From: Defense Contract Management Agency, 
2002) 
Figure 2 shows the numerous factors that affect the transition of a weapons 
system or an entire mission area to PBL.  Logistics support does not necessarily shift 
from organic DoD resources to industry resources because of the transition to PBL.  
However, business-DoD relationships must be structured to meet the warfighter’s 
performance requirements.  These relationships will most likely be structured differently 





Figure 2.   Transition to PBL (From: “A Program Manager’s Guide to Buying 
Performance,” 2001) 
 
2. Enablers and Barriers to Implementation 
Dr. Hank J. Devries conducted research relating to the barriers and enablers for 
PBL contracts.  In his research, a data survey was created and sent out to 26 key PBL 
points of contact (POC) within each of the Services.  The Service POCs instructed 
program managers who had undergone PBL implementations within their respective 
Services to fill out the data survey.  The following figures show the results of Dr. 






















































Figure 3.   PBL Enablers Identified 
 
Figure 4.   PBL Barriers Identified 
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D. PBL TRAINING AND EDUCATION 
1. Online Training 
DAU offers two sets of online training material for PBL.  There is the DoD 5000 
Tutorial and a Performance Based Logistics Training Module.  The DoD 5000 Tutorial 
walks the student through the DoD Directive 5000.1, the DoD Instruction 5000.2 and the 
Defense Acquisition Guidebook.  The DoD Directive 5000.1 provides the policies and 
principles that govern the defense acquisition system.  The DoD Instruction 5000.2 
establishes the management framework that implements these policies and principles.  
The Defense Acquisition Guidebook “is an interactive, web-based capability designed to 
provide the acquisition workforce and their industry partners with an instant on-line 
reference to best business practices as well as supporting policy, statute, and lessons 
learned” (Defense Acquisition University Website, n.d.).   
The Performance Based Logistics Training Module is a continuous learning 
module.  The course is based on the March 2005 DoD Performance-Based Logistics 
Guidebook entitled, “Performance Based Logistics: A Program Manager’s Product 
Support Guide.”  In order to receive credit for the course, the student must take an exam 
and pass with a score of 100% (Defense Acquisition University Website, n.d.). 
2. Training for Contracting Officers in the Field 
The PBL training offered for contracting officers in the field is the same training 
that is offered online by the DAU.  While speaking with those individuals working on the 
PBL contracts for the H-1, it appears that they have taken the online training, but have 
not been offered any other formal training or education on PBL.  It also appears that 
while these individuals are experts in the field of contracting, they are not experts in the 
field of PBL.  As previously noted, lack of PBL training is one of the barriers to 
implementing PBL contracts. 
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III.  METHODOLOGY 
A.  RESEARCH CONTEXT   
The idea for this project came from past experience while serving in Iraq.  At the 
time, there was a general lack of understanding of why parts were not stockpiled in 
greater numbers, even at the sharpest end of the spear.  Throughout course work and case 
studies in the academic setting, it became evident that inventory management was a small 
piece of a larger, more complex problem.   
Exposure to PBL in the academic environment broadened the authors’ 
understanding in interpreting supply/maintenance management issues.  Upon 
examination of the H-1 Upgrade Program, a need was discovered to focus on long-term 
supportability of legacy systems as the fleet transitions to the new models.  The intent of 
this project is to focus on a method to select components for PBL agreements, not to 
solve the total weapon system support package.   
PBL as a strategy is not only required as identified in the previous chapter, but is 
a viable solution to preserve Ao of the legacy systems as the improved models are 
fielded.  A good PBL established around the following attributes can sustain/improve 
readiness for the H-1 Program.  These attributes were developed by researchers at the 
University of Tennessee conducting a PBL benchmarking study funded by the U.S. Air 
Force: 
• Performance Definition.  Top-level overarching outcomes maximizing 
readiness, availability, reliability, cycle time, and affordability.  
• Performance Measurement.  Minimum number of top-level ‘Outcome’ 
metrics that measure and are aligned to warfighter needs and tightly 
aligned with Support Provider scope of authority.  
• Workload Allocation. Workloads are distributed to the most effective 
providers consistent with statutory guidelines, best competencies, and best 
value; effective use of Public-Private Partnering (PPP). 
• Contract Length. Multiple year or Multi-year contract term with high 
confidence level for exercising options/award term years.   
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• Contract Type and Terms.  Fixed Price with explicit or implicit incentive 
toward achievement of top-level system outcomes that include 
availability, reliability, product & process improvement and affordability.   
• Performance Incentives.  Incentives tightly aligned, promoting behaviors 
and outcomes that benefit both Customer and Support Provider. 
• Product and Process Improvement. Support Provider is clearly 
incentivized and afforded authority to plan for and implement continuous 
product and process improvement (e.g., Six Sigma). 
• Stakeholder Perspectives.  Strong consensus across all stakeholders 
toward common support strategy objectives. Strong top-down support to 
align stakeholders for optimal solution. (Performance-based Logistics, 
2008)  
• These attributes focus on the outcome that warfighters desire, having the 
right part, at the right place, at the right time.   
While implementing a PBL arrangement, the contract with the provider spells out 
the level of performance required by the provider in order to meet the warfighter’s 
requirement.  The description of performance is not expressed in prescriptive methods; 
however, it is expressed in terms of measurable outcomes.  In addition, the measurement 
and evaluation tools and criteria are described along with the payment linked to 
successful performance.  The purpose of the contract is to inform the contractor what the 
desired outcomes are, not to tell the contractor how to reach the desired outcomes.  In 
other words, the contractor is told what to do, not how to do it (A Program Manager’s 
Guide to Buying Performance, 2001). 
While creating a performance-based contract, there are government provided 
resources that discuss best practices for drafting statements of work, solicitations, and 
quality assurance plans, and awarding and administering performance-based contracts.  
One of these resources is A Guide to Best Practices for Performance-Based Service 
Contracting, published by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) (n.d.). 
According to OFPP, there are four elements that must be present in order for any 
acquisition to be deemed performance-based.  Those elements are: 
• Performance requirements that define the work in measurable, mission-
related terms 
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• Performance standards (i.e., quality, quantity, timeliness) tied to 
performance requirements 
• A quality assurance plan that describes how the contractor’s performance 
will be measured against the performance standards 
• If the acquisition is either critical to mission accomplishment or requires 
relatively large expenditures of funds, positive and negative incentives tied 
to the quality assurance plan measurements (A Program Manager’s Guide 
to Buying Performance, 2001) 
B. CANDIDATE SELECTION 
The following section is provided to illustrate the steps taken to identify the 
individual component to use as basis of the authors’ analysis and as an outline of their 
method to reach the selection of a viable PBL candidate, which they suggest be utilized 
by logistic managers for their PBL selection process.       
Contact was made with the Director of H-1 Logistics in April 2007, in which a 
general question was posed pertaining to how the H-1 program was approaching PBL 
contracts on legacy systems.  Their plan began by only considering components that Bell 
Helicopter managed directly, and was intended to expand from there.2  Currently, they 
have PBA on eleven families containing twenty-one national stock numbers (NSNs), all 
manufactured and repaired by Bell Helicopter (Garvey, 2006). 
As the transition from the legacy platforms begins, the challenge now for the H-1 
program is to select the right candidates to pursue PBL contracts that result in improved 
Ao, without limiting selection to Bell-managed components.   
The method the authors propose is both intuitive and critical, with thought given 
to PBL principles/metrics and better business practices.  It considers multiple desired 
outcomes (described above) of reduced costs, reduced down time (Logistics Response 
Time), and increased Ao.  The overarching goal is to select a component for which a PBL 
arrangement can increase reliability and maintainability. The following steps are 
proposed as a guide to streamline the selection process: 
 
                                                 
2 John Baranowski, Personal interview, June 2008. 
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• Review Maintenance Output Reports 
• PBL Matrix Fit 
• Gather Additional Data/Fleet Input 
• Conduct Data Analysis 
• Benchmark  
C. CANDIDATE EVALUATION – METHODOLOGY 
1. Review Maintenance Output Reports 
The primary purpose of this step is to narrow the number of components to 
analyze with greater scrutiny later in the process.  
The report used by the authors to review usage data on the AH-1W was an Excel 
file provided by the H-1 IWST Director at NAVICP Philadelphia.  This particular report 
ranked the top ten Not Mission Capable (NMC) components during the provided 
timeframe.  The categories that the authors paid close attention to were NMC, Not 
Mission Capable Maintenance (NMCM), Not Mission Capable Supply (NMCS), Direct 
Maintenance Man-hour (DMMH), Beyond Capable Maintenance (BCM), 
Cannibalization (CANN), and Support Cost.   
The intent is not to focus selection on one single performance category in 
selecting candidates for PBL contracts, but to utilize a holistic approach that encompasses 
all or a combination of the identified categories above.     
There is potential for overlap among these categories.   Components that have a 
negative impact on NMCM, NMCS, DMMH, BCM, and CANN all reduce the logistics 
response time of the end item, thus negatively impacting Ao.  A component ranked high 
in BCM reflects a capability that the fleet does not have to repair the assets at the 
organic/intermediate level. 
Whether it is feasible to obtain this capability by the fleet can not be answered at 
this level of analysis but should trigger additional consideration as a candidate.  A 
component that is cannibalized at a high rate also deserves extra consideration.  
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Cannibalization is a method of survival when there are shortages; however, it is a huge 
indicator of waste that, if eliminated, can greatly impact Ao.  The potential to double 
count the removal of components, thus increasing DMMH, is a danger when 
cannibalization actions occur. 
2. PBL Matrix Fit 
Within this step, the intent is to challenge the list of components by measuring 
their fit within the five overarching DoD PBL (system-level) metrics:  Ao, reliability, 
cost per use, logistics response time, and logistics footprint (Weston-Dawkes, 2006).   
Although the authors agree that it is important to analyze system-level metrics 
when considering PBL candidates, this project limits itself to component-level analysis of 
only two metrics: Logistics Response Time and Logistics Footprint.  There are three 
reasons for this restriction.  First, because the system-level analysis required for Ao, 
system-level reliability, footprint, response time and cost per unit usage is beyond the 
scope of the thesis, it would require the construction of an integrated system-level 
simulation model.  Second, the authors believe that in general, component level response 
time (and component level reliability in particular) is a core metric that drives the other 
metrics.  Finally, the authors believe that component footprint is especially easy to impact 
with outsourcing in general, and PBL in particular (Eaton, 2004).   
The authors suggest that more time be spent on identifying components with poor 
reliability and exploring the reasons why there appears to be reliability issues (e.g., faulty 
design or cannibalization due to supply response time).  The authors suggest that a team 
of experts explore the uniqueness of each component within the PBL metrics as follows: 
a. Logistics Response Time 
In conducting analysis, ask the following questions to determine 
appropriate fit for a PBL contract: 
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(1) Can a third party logistics (3pl) provider reduce the existing 
transit and repair time?  A caveat to this question is, is the repair facility properly 
incentivized to improve the reliability of the component? 
(2) If more than one repair facility is in place, can consolidation to 
one repair facility reduce overall LRT based on the existing supply chain management 
structure?  The answer to this question may also have cost implications. 
(3) Should the Intermediate Maintenance Facility be part of the 
equation or should the entire support agreement be written in order to eliminate the IMA 
capability for manpower re-allocation initiatives?  There are both cost and long-term 
capability issues associated with this question. 
(4) Would a PPP reduce turn-around-time more effectively than a 
PBL contract? 
(5) What are the readiness implications associated with the current 
level of component reliability? 
b. Logistics Footprint 
Consideration must be given to the existing support structure for repair on 
each component.  The key is to identify the possibility of reducing the footprint required 
without experiencing a negative impact on availability.  In some cases a mixture of 
military and civilian personnel are necessary for proper support.  Scrutiny should be 
given to components that already have robust facilities established for repair in which 
there is available capacity to exploit and where reliable maintenance is already being 
performed.  Components that already have a small footprint, which require minimal 
maintenance resources, are not good candidates for a PBL. 
Even though the authors are limiting their analysis to only two criteria 
(component response time and footprint), it is possible that these two criteria may not 
point to the same component as a primary target for improvement with PBL.  There are 
accepted tools to look at multi-criteria ranking (Analytical Hierarchy Processing, simple 
Multi-Attribute Ranking Technique, etc.) that can be used in the process of choosing 
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among components to select the one that would be best served (in terms of all criteria 
combined) by a PBL contract.   However, the use of these tools is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, which is limited to the analysis of a single component. 
3. Gather Additional Data/Fleet Input 
This step is rather basic yet crucial for maximized results.  Contact should be 
made to supply support managers (MALS Supply Officers and enlisted personnel), 
maintenance personnel at all levels, item/inventory managers, OEM artisans, engineers, 
program managers, and operators of the end item.   
NAVSUP in their PBL process do accomplish this task through development of 
Integrated Product Teams (IPT) (Garvey, 2006).  These teams discuss lessons learned and 
issues that arise from their area of expertise in the supply/support chain.  The method the 
authors propose is to follow this similar format, focusing on standardization and 
transparency for the end user. 
Depending on how much resident knowledge the logistic manager possesses of 
the entire weapon system and its function/mission, it may be better to perform this step 
before step two.   That is, some logistics managers may prefer to gather fleet input first, 
before assessing PBL fit. 
4. Data Analysis 
Specific data to analyze will depend on the component selected.  Consideration 
should be given to evident trends in reliability or lack thereof.  The goal in data analysis 
is to use near real-time information to justify logistics decisions based off actual 
outcomes such as increased demand, demand spike, and reduced time on wing.  Again 
component dependent, there may be data available that reflect a reduction in availability 
due to supply response time or operational environment constraints.   
As an example of the kind of data analysis that the authors recommend, the next 
chapter will conduct an analysis on logistics response time data from a single component 
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(a hydraulic actuator).  The analysis will focus on the reliability of this component, 
because it has been a readiness degrader in the past. 
5. Benchmark 
By benchmarking, the authors are suggesting that planners should compare the 
processes they are considering for PBA to successfully implemented PBL strategies of 
other platforms/programs.  Examples include the F/A-18 E/F Integrated Readiness 
Support Teaming (FIRST), F404 Engine, Honeywell Auxiliary Power Unit (APU), and 
NATO Sea Sparrow/TAS/MK-23 (Garvey, 2006). 
There is no such thing as an one-sized-fits all PBL contract.  Each program has 
different requirements and objectives.  However, when looking at PBL contracts that are 
currently in place, there are common themes and strategies.  A PBL strategy is designed 
with two major objectives being balanced throughout the entire life cycle of a weapon 
system.  These objectives are that “the requirement for logistics support must be 
minimized through technology insertion and refreshment, and the cost-effectiveness of 
the logistics products and services must be continually improved.”  Another strategy of 
PBL contracts is to find the appropriate level of flexibility and agility so that the project 
can continue to evolve as new technology is created and the warfighter’s requirements 
change (“A Program Manager’s Guide to Buying Performance”, 2001). 
In addition to looking at common themes and strategies of PBL contracts, one can 
look to successful contracts to find proper objectives and performance metrics for their 
program.  For instance, the United States Air Force (USAF) has a PBL contract with 
Boeing for the C-17 Globemaster airframe and subcomponent.  This arrangement 
includes six performance metrics: 
• Globemaster Sustainment Aircraft Availability (GSAA) is the measure of 
the overall health and availability of the fleet. 
• Depot Scheduling is a measure of the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
C-17 depot maintenance program. 
• Flying Hours Achievable is another metric focused on availability of the 
fleet and its contribution to wartime preparedness. 
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• Parts Issue Effectiveness (repairables and consumables) is a supply chain 
metric to measure how quickly the supply system delivers parts and 
consumables once a need is identified. 
• Mission Capable (MICAP) Parts Management is a specific measure of 
critical parts availability. 
• Customer Satisfaction is a subjective measure that gives the customer a 
real-time feedback mechanism and an input opportunity to contractor 
rewards. (Openshaw, n.d.) 
Another program that can be looked at is the United States Army Shadow Tactical 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV).  This PBL arrangement, scheduled for 
implementation in 2007, wrote the contract in order to obtain higher system availability, 
improved mean-time-before-system-abort, reduced logistics footprint and higher overall 
system readiness levels.  Additionally, one can look at the USAF F-117 Nighthawk PBL 
contract with Lockheed Martin Corporation.  This contract, awarded in 1998, included 
depot maintenance, engineering technical assistance, logistics support, spare parts 
administration and subcontractor management (Openshaw, n.d.). 
This chapter has presented a general format to follow in identifying candidate 
components for PBL contracts, evaluating those candidates, and benchmarking successful 
PBL contracts on other similar components.  The progression through the method 
suggested here by the authors is outlined in the following chapter.  Although the authors 
will touch briefly upon candidate identification and benchmarking, their focus in the next 
chapter will be on the evaluation of a single component, a hydraulic actuator, in order to 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
Previous chapters outlined the methodology that the authors propose personnel 
follow when considering components for PBL. The purpose of this chapter is provide the 
framework/methodology followed in selecting the dual hydraulic actuator (NIIN 01-434-
3866), in order to illustrate the recommended analysis.   
A. CANDIDATE EVALUATION – PROCESS 
1. Review Maintenance Reports 
In June 2008, the authors visited NAVICP Philadelphia and talked with the H-1 
Assistant Deputy Program Manager for Logistics (DPML) and the H-1 Integrated 
Weapon Support Team (IWST) Director.  They provided numerous reports on the 
degraders for both the AH-1W and UH-1N platforms.  Since the UH-1Ys are already 
being delivered to the fleet and the AH-1Zs are not due to start arriving at the training 
squadron until 2012, the authors felt it was best to focus their attention on AH-1W 
components where long term contracts could have greater impact on fleet readiness.  Of 
the reports received, the one that consolidated the data best was the AH-1W top 
degraders from the 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2008.  
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 AH-1W TOP TEN MAR - MAY 08          FLT HRS 10,393 10=1 CANN 























1432300 DUAL HYDRAULIC ACTUATOR ** 01-434-3866 7R 600 1 8 1 4  3 4 4  2 $1,436,182
1531300 MAIN ROTOR SWASHPLT/SUPPORT ASSY ** 01-300-1621 7R 799 2 7 2       9 $185,426
1532100 MAIN ROTOR BLADE ASSY ** 01-411-5215 7R 770 3 1      10  8 $580,265
1531100 MAIN ROTOR CNTRL SCISS/SLEEVE ASSY ** 01-417-8146 7R 1,485 4 3         $302,593
1532200 MAIN ROTOR HUB ASSY ** 01-408-6574 7R 371 5  8  9   3 7 10 $2,262,434
1532230 DRAG BRACE ASSY ** 01-256-8197 3G 6,929 6 2        7 $4,108
29H1E30 FORWARD ENGINE MOUNT TRIPOD ASSY ** 01-256-7481 3B 611 7          $136,235
1531400 MAIN ROTOR PITCH CHANGE LINK ASSY ** 01-411-7075 3B 650 8 4        8 $73,733
4641300 FORWARD FUEL CELL 01-261-3082 9B 1,485 9  10        $12,397
1533340 OUTBOARD ROD END BEARING, TR ** 01-166-4555 9B 1,732 10 9     8   5 $16,683
1136552 RH FAIRING ASSY LL-CRP-V080 1R 3,464  5         $606
46431 FUEL QUANTITY INDICATOR 01-044-3479 7R 358  6        10 $38,505
29H1D80 ENGINE STARTER ** 01-476-3224 7R 547  10    1 7   9 $488,268
26531 NO 1 HANGER ASSY 01-256-7479 3B 226   3    10  6 9 $277,571
29H1S12 RH EXHAUST DUCT ASSY 01-290-6522 7R 1,732   4        $1,720
1131300 GUNNER AND PILOT AREA SYSTEM  650   5        $6,114
22100 T700 ENGINE PROPULSION SYSTEM NA  770   6 9 2      $103,318
26540 42 DEGREE GEARBOX ASSY ** 01-240-5420 7R 472   7       10 $160,749
4231C70 ANTICOLLISION LIGHT 00-686-4150 9B 168   9       5 $33,769
74N9800 SU188/AWS1(V) TELESCOP SIGHT UNIT (TSU) 01-525-5683 7R 102    5  10  2  9 $2,404,362
74N32 ELECTRONIC INTERFACE ASSY 00-578-0721 7R 1,732          4 $23,904
71RDS C-12617/A CNTRL DISPLAY PROCESS (CDNU) 01-452-8949 7R 385      5 5   1 $105,047
653AH00 RT1558( )/APX100(V) RDR RCVR XMTR (NVG) 01-360-3841 7R 358          6 $72,064
761M200 CP1975/AAR47 COMPUTER PROCESSOR 01-495-3646 7R 1,732          10 $41,826
766S200 T-1360A(V)1/ALQ-144A(V) TRANSMITTER ** 01-323-4999 7R 106     3  1   3 $206,904 
Figure 5.   AH-1W Top Ten Degraders 
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The report was ordered by NMC rank.  At the top of the list is the Dual Hydraulic 
Actuator; however, selection was not based on this fact alone.  While reviewing this 
report, the authors took into account that the actuator ranked 8th NMCM, 1st NMCS, 4th 
DMMH, 3rd BCM, 4th Removed (REM) and 2nd CANN.  Another notable category was 
the mean time between failures (MTBF) at 600 hours.  This was peculiar because past 
experience with this airframe revealed that these actuators had a forced removal time of 
2200 or 1350 hours depending on the part that was installed.  Following their holistic 
approach, the authors noticed that there was a good possibility that the reason this 
component was ranked 2nd in cannibalization was because it was also the number one 
supply degrader.  Normally the maintenance department would not want to cannibalize 
this component due to mismatching part numbers.  The AH-1W requires three dual 
hydraulic actuators to operate.  Publication NAVAIR 01-H1AAC-2-5 identifies the 
requirement for different mounting hardware for the cyclic and collective actuators.  The 
dual hydraulic actuators are interchangeable; however, the mounting hardware is not. 
Another risk in cannibalizing this component is damaging the mounting hardware in the 
process. Thus, from experience, cannibalizing this component could create more 
problems than what it is worth.  The 8th ranking in NMCM does not account for the time 
involved in performing controllability checks via functional check flight (FCF) 
procedures.  It also must be considered that the IMA may or may not have the capability 
to repair this component, as shown by the REM and BCM rankings. 
As noted, the authors’ approach in selecting the actuator was holistic: they looked 
across NMCM, NMCS, MTBF, BCM, etc., and used their experience and intuition to 
select a candidate for further analysis.  Although they conducted no formal analysis 
across these criteria, the authors noted that no other WUC ranked as high across all 
criteria.   In other words, in this case the formal analysis was considered to be 
unnecessary.  Where the situation is less clear, or there is disagreement among 
stakeholders, the authors recommend using one of the many multiple-criteria decision 
making tools available to formally rank WUCs across criteria.  This would not preclude 
the use of experience and intuition as well: the authors view the multiple criteria ranking 
tools as providing additional input, when necessary.  
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It is also important to note that personnel within the support pipeline may not 
have the resident knowledge of this aircraft; therefore, selecting the dual hydraulic 
actuator for further analysis may not be as intuitive.  However, the authors were able to 
narrow the selection further by identifying that the Main Rotor Hub Assembly and Main 
Rotor Blade assembly were already in-work on PBL with Bell along with the other 
components, as illustrated in Figure 6. 
2. PBL Matrix Fit 
To get a better understanding of the repair process of this component, contact was 
made with Fleet Support Team (FST) Cherry Point in North Carolina.  The authors 
learned that the actuator was repaired at two facilities: Singapore Technologies (ST) 
Aerospace in Singapore and Corpus Christi Army Depot (CCAD) located in Corpus 
Christi, TX.  Both facilities rely on HR Textron for piece parts required for re-
work/manufacturing.  This information is necessary in order to evaluate the feasibility to 

















Nomenclature NSN Part Number 
Gearbox Assembly 3010-01-256-7681 214-040-013-105 
Indicator, Pressure 6620-01-256-8371 209-375-047-105 
Fan Assembly, Hydr 1660-01-302-1006 209-040-016-107 
Indicator, Pressure 6685-01-302-1006 214-175-256-105 
Wing Assembly 1560-01-443-7090 209-020-004-123 
Wing Assembly 1560-01-256-7640 209-020-004-107 
Wing Assembly 1560-01-411-0180 209-020-004-119 
Scissors & Sleeve Assy 1615-01-443-8146 214-010-501-117 
Blade, Rotary Wing 1615-01-411-5215 209-015-001-105 
Blade, Rotary Wing 1615-01-039-0927 209-015-001-001 
Blade, Rotary Wing 1615-01-256-8268 209-015-001-101 
Transmission Mast 1615-01-246-6669 209-015-001-119 
Wing Assembly 1560-01-443-7060 209-020-004-124 
Wing Assembly 1560-01-262-3249 209-020-004-108 
Wing Assembly 1560-01-355-3907 209-020-004-116 
Wing Assembly 1560-01-411-0182 209-020-004-120 
Charger, Battery 6130-01-417-2165 214-175-379-105 
Gyro Assembly 6615-01-083-9447 209-075-698-001 
Hub, Rotor 1615-01-408-6574 214-010-100-211 
Hub, Rotor 1615-01-278-3622 214-010-100-197 
Blade, Rotary Wing 1615-01-173-7439 204-012-001-027 
 
Figure 6.   NAVICP Listing of H-1 PBL Candidates (From: H-1 Program Priorities)3 
 
   
 
                                                 
3 Received via email from John Baranowski, H-1 Director of Logistics, May 2008. 
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a. Logistics Response Time 
In the opinion of the authors, location of the two repair facilities is a 
support multiplier.  Assets inducted into the repair cycle from overseas (in theatre or 
Japan) could be directed to the ST Aerospace facility, reducing the in-transit time.  Assets 
inducted within the United States could be directed to CCAD.  Discussion with the item 
manager at NAVICP confirmed that this is generally the process followed.  The item 
manager noted the large business operations of ST Aerospace as compared to CCAD.  He 
also said that ST Aerospace was the organization that was instrumental in solving the 
shortage of components available to the Navy.   
The authors inquired further into ST Aerospace’s role in increasing 
component availability.  The impression obtained was that ST Aerospace and CCAD had 
difficulties obtaining the piece parts needed to re-build the actuators.  The authors asked 
the item manager what exactly transpired that resolved the piece part availability to ST 
Aerospace and CCAD suppliers, but a reasonable explanation could not be acquired.   
This issue is an area of concern for future readiness availability.  Defense 
Logistics Agency (DLA) manages the piece parts for this component.  There seems to be 
some sort of breakdown between DLA and the two repair facilities.  A few questions to 
consider are:  
• What measures were taken to ensure future piece part availability 
to ST Aerospace and CCAD? 
• Could a PBL arrangement incentivize either repair facility to 
manage the piece parts necessary for re-work of these actuators 
and result in better service to the fleet?   
• Were there contractual problems between DLA and its suppliers 
that caused the shortage of piece part availability?   
• What steps were taken to avoid this problem?   
At this stage of the analysis it is important for managers to explore the 
relationships of the entire supply chain to pin-point root causes and their effect on the 
overall reliability of the systems they are managing.  In this case, pursuing a PBL 
agreement with either repair facility or the OEM, HR Textron may be in the best interest 
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of the United States Navy (USN).  Incentives inviting these organizations to take a more 
active role in the re-manufacture/manufacture of these components, to include managing 
the inventory levels of the piece parts in lieu of DLA management, could positively 
impact the overall readiness of the AH-1W.   
b. The Role of Reliability within Logistics Response Time  
A more effective way to impact Ao, and coincidently the focus of PBL, is 
the realm of reliability.  With a MTBF of 600 (refer to Figure 5) on the components 
removed during the third quarter of fiscal year 2008 and an overall MTBF on components 
removed dating back to January 12, 2005 of 790, reliability is clearly an issue.  These 
components have a forced removal of 2200 or 1350 flight hours depending on which 
component is installed (NAVAIR 01-H1AAC-6, 2005).  An assumption made here is that 
after 2200 hours of operation the component has a greater probability of failure; 
therefore, removal of this component is required.  Answers to the following questions 
should be considered in regard to the lifetime of this component:   
• Failure of what internal/external component drives the early 
removal?  
• At what level of maintenance can the repairs be made, i.e., does the 
Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) have repair capabilities 
on this component?   
Contact was made with Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron-29 in New 
River, NC.  The production control (PC) chief informed the authors that this component 
has a status of X1 on the Individual Component Repair Listing (ICRL).  In other words 
the Intermediate-level (I-level) does not have repair capabilities on this asset and 
therefore the component is an automatic beyond capable maintenance (BCM) X1 upon 
induction into the repair cycle.  Researching solutions or answers to why this component 
is not repaired at the I-level is beyond the scope of this project, but may lead to some 
practical low-cost solutions if the engineers and the support personnel could find the right 
combination of I-level and depot repair.  The authors are not armed with the technical 
knowledge of how these components are repaired; however, they have found that a bench 
is currently available for the I-level to perform limited repairs and is in use at MALS-39, 
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Camp Pendleton, CA.  Unfortunately, this capability is not available forward deployed.4 
An expansion of this capability may be the direction the H-1 community would prefer to 
pursue, but the authors did not research the cost implications in order to recommend a 
viable solution via PBL or organic means.    
Additional data was obtained to explore the reliability concerns of this 
component.  Analysis of this data will be covered in more detail under the analysis 
section of this methodology. 
c. Logistics Footprint 
Internal repair on the dual hydraulic actuator requires access to a “clean 
room.”  The purpose of a clean room to control the environment in order to minimize 
airborne particles that would interfere with the operation of the hydraulic actuator.  When 
considering the current operating environment in Iraq and Afghanistan, the likelihood of 
obtaining a true clean room would be too costly.  In this case there are some tradeoffs to 
consider when deciding what capability to obtain or relinquish through PPP via PBL.  
The design or use of existing mobile facilities for the IMA to use in partnership with HR 
Textron for piece part support may be worth exploring.   
In this sense, a larger footprint with on-hand repair capability must be 
compared with the advantages and disadvantages in outsourcing this capability and 
making up for the response time by maintaining the proper level of spares.  Currently, 
there seems to be some confusion at the management level as to what the minimum 
amount of spares for the actuator should be.  The reduction of spares is another aspect of 
logistics footprint; however, when considering spare levels, reliability is an integral part 
of the discussion.  Although this project does not explore reliability in great detail, the 
authors will provide an illustration within their data analysis of the data they received that 
highlights potential reliability issues of the component.   
                                                 
4 Captain English, acting Aircraft Maintenance Officer MALS-39, personal communication, 
November 2008. 
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3. Gather Additional Data/Input from the Fleet 
This was a continuous process throughout this project.  As stated in the previous 
chapters, this step is interchangeable, and it may be in the interest of planners/managers 
to seek this information prior to accessing PBL Metrics Fit.  The authors reached back to 
Fleet Support Team (FST) Cherry Point, the item manager at NAVICP, an airframes 
division chief at the squadron level, Maintenance Material Control Officers (MMCO) at 
the HML/A squadron and MALS Aircraft Maintenance Officer (AMO), Assistant 
Aircraft Maintenance Officer (AAMO), and Production Control Officer (PCO) to 
facilitate knowledge sharing and increase their situational awareness of the support 
available/required for this particular component. 
4. Data Analysis 
a. Creating the Model 
Crystal Ball® was selected as a tool in order to provide a means to 
simulate the removal of components based upon the actual data received from 
maintenance records in the Naval Aviation Logistics Command/Management Information 
System (NALCOMIS) from the fleet.  Simulation allows the authors to use the historical 
reliability data to replicate many other potential scenarios.  Depicting trends in data and 
forecasting future events is easier to see/predict as the number of replications increase.  In 
the authors’ analysis, this software package and its output (graphs/charts) provide them 
with some valuable insight into the reliability of this component and enable a more 
accurate prediction of what the failure rates could be if the reliability of this component is 
improved. 
The basis of the analysis was a data file received from FST that contained 
a snapshot of the statuses of actuators in the circulation.  The data file included 
installation/removal dates, time on the component upon removal and the time on the 
components available in the supply system.   
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There are two part numbers for the dual actuator.  The two are identical 
except for their forced removal times.  One part number has a forced removal time of 
2200 hours; the other’s is 1350 hours.  The authors choose to limit their analysis of the 
2200-hour actuators for simplicity.  The range or removal dates reported in this file is 
from January 2005 to August 2008.  The mean time these components were removed was 
found to be approximately 790, with a standard deviation of 679 hours and a coefficient 
of variation of 0.86.   
It is not strictly correct to treat the hours in this dataset as reliability data.  
The data are potentially censored for several reasons:  
• Due to cannibalization actions, some components were likely 
removed from an aircraft that experienced other maintenance 
issues.  In order to fill a hole on another aircraft that required an 
actuator, a fully functional actuator was removed.  These 
occurrences could not be separated from the data set. 
• Some components were removed for external discrepancies caused 
inadvertently by maintainers while facilitating other maintenance 
that cannot be directly contributed to a faulty component. 
• Some components could have been removed for extensive 
corrosion due to environmental conditions that would reflect the 
lack of preventative maintenance. 
Based on their personal experience, the authors believe that these 
occurrences are most likely few in number.  However, they can affect the overall 
accuracy of the reliability calculations made, and so the authors cannot be sure how many 
of the data are censored.  However, since the purpose in this chapter is only to illustrate 
an approach, and not to provide an exact analysis of the reliability of this part, it will be 
assumed that the effect of censoring on the data is not significant.   
With these assumptions in mind a Crystal Ball model was developed with 
the intent of using the actual data in order to: 1) predict the probability that the actuator 
will last until 2200 hours, and 2) predict the number of hours that an actuator will reach 
with a 95% probability.  Both of these statistics are important in building a plan for 
sparing the component.  The first, called ‘readiness risk’ (Kang, et al., 2007) provides the 
probability that (frequency with which) a part will need to be replaced before its (current) 
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planned maintenance.  Assuming 95% is the planned availability of the part, the second 
statistic provides a simple estimate of the number of hours that may be relied upon before 
the part needs to be replaced by a spare.    
The authors also used Crystal Ball to compare these two statistics across 
three different distributions.  Crystal Ball allows simulation of data (the building of an 
empirical distribution) directly from the data.  In addition, it provides a tool to fit the data 
to several analytical distributions (such as the Normal).  Analytical distributions such as 
the Normal, Weibull and Beta can be superior to the empirical distribution because (for 
example) they allow the estimation of statistics which fall outside the range of empirical 
observation, such as the probability that an actuator will last to 2500 hours.  In addition to 
fitting the data to these analytical distributions, Crystal Ball tests the goodness-of-fit of 
the data across analytical distributions to determine which analytical distribution best fits 
the data.  In this case, the Beta distribution was selected as providing the best fit 
according to the Anderson-Darling statistic.  However, the Beta can assume a wider 
variety of shapes than most of the other distributions.  There is no theoretical reason why 
these data should follow a Beta Distribution, and the goodness-of-fit may simply be an 
artifact of the sample, and the flexibility of the distribution.  Hence, the authors also fit 
the data to a Weibull distribution.  “The Weibull distribution is one of the most widely 
used lifetime distributions in reliability engineering. It is a versatile distribution that can 
take on the characteristics of other types of distributions, based on the value of the shape 
parameter, β” (Weibull.com, 2006).  The Weibull distribution is a good fit for analysis 
purposes because the dual hydraulic actuator chance of failure increases as time 
progresses.  While it did not fit the data as well as the Beta, the fit of the Weibull was 
also acceptable.   
Results are shown in Figures 7-13.  Note that the graphs in Figures 8-13 
show distributions, not confidence intervals.  The authors are only reporting point 
estimates, not confidence intervals.  Crystal Ball does provide a tool for bootstrap 
analysis, which would allow the construction of confidence intervals for the estimates 
reported in Figure 6, but it was not deemed necessary for the purposes of this illustration.  
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Partly because the authors are only reporting point estimates, the number of ‘trials’ or 
simulated engine removals, was set at a large number (10,000). 
 Initial Run 
20% Reliability 
Improvement   
Mean 789.6 948   
Standard 
Deviation 679.7 679.7   
     
     




% to 2200 97.1 95.2 96.9 94.2 
95% avail 5 63.3 11.5 141.8 
 
Figure 7.   Crystal Ball Model 
b. Interpreting the Output 
(1)  % to 2200 - This can be read as the percentage of actuator removals 
that occurred in less than 2200 hours.  For example, the forecast following a Weibull 
distribution estimates that, of the 10,000 components, 9,522 will be replaced by 2200 
hours.  This does not reflect an attractive reliability rate for the dual hydraulic actuator. 
(2)  95% avail - This is an estimate of the number of hours of usage at 
least 95% of the components will have upon removal.  For example, the forecast 
following a Weibull distribution estimates that fewer than 95% of the actuators will last 
beyond 63.3 hours.  
The authors cannot suggest what the target level for these two statistics 
should be; however, from a maintenance managers perspective they would like to have a 
component last close to the planned replacement (2200-hour) threshold, giving them the 
flexibility to remove the component earlier due to scheduled/unscheduled maintenance on 
the aircraft that would require the removal of the components anyhow.  Without a higher 
level of reliability, removal of these components possesses a greater strain on squadron  
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maintainers.  As shown in Figure 10, the model using a Weibull distribution forecasts that 
only 4.78% (1.00 – .9522) of the 10,000 components will last longer than the 2200-hour 
threshold. 
(3) In another iteration of the model, the authors assumed a 20% increase 
in the overall mean of the actuator removal times (from 790 to 948). They also assumed 
the same standard deviation as calculated from the original data (679.7).  The 95% avail 
hours (95% of parts last at least this many hours) estimate increased from 63.3 to 141.8 
(124% increase).  However, even with the simulated 20% improvement the resulting time 
upon removal is anemic.  As shown in Figure 13, the model using a Weibull distribution 
forecasts that only 5.78% (1.00-.9422) of the 10,000 components will last longer than the 
2200-hour threshold.  In translation, the 20% increase of the mean removal times does 
not equate to a 20% increase in readiness or in the overall reliability of this component.  
In fact, the simulated 20% increase in reliability resulted in a 1% reduction in readiness 
risk from 95.22% (100%-4.78%) to 94.22% (100%-5.78%).   According to the analysis, 
even a 20% increase of the mean would still indicate that there are some potential issues 
with this component, whether documentation errors from removals that actually did not 
require removal (human error) or actual reliability concerns with the design of the 
actuator itself.  
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c. Crystal Ball Charts  
 
Figure 8.   Actual Data Distribution after 10,000 Trials 
 
Figure 9.   Weibull Distribution of Data after 10,000 Trials 
 41
  
Figure 10.   Best Fit (Beta) Distribution of Data after 10,000 Trials 
 
 




Figure 12.   Weibull Distribution Demonstrating Certainty of Components Bypassing 
2200 Threshold 
 
Figure 13.   Weibull Distribution Demonstrating Certainty of Components Bypassing 
2200 Threshold with 20% Reliability Improvement 
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d. Overall Analysis 
The overall synopsis of the dual hydraulic actuator simulated under the 
authors’ defined assumptions shows that there may be a significant issue with the 
reliability of this component.  If the government is paying for this component on the 
assumption that it will last 2200 hours, then according to this analysis the actuator is not 
performing as expected. 
5. Benchmarking 
Benchmarking this approach against previous successful PBL programs that 
followed a similar approach is beyond the scope of this project.  However, based on the 
authors’ conversations with SMEs, they believe that there is a need for a more formal 
selection process (such as the one the authors outlined), and more formal analysis (such 
as the reliability analysis the authors reported upon) to develop further appropriate 
candidates for PBL contracts.  
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V.   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. DISCUSSION 
With one of the authors having spent numerous hours getting intimately familiar 
with the mechanical/supply support woes of the AH-1W airframe, but also, in the 
position of Maintenance Material Control Officer (MMCO) recognizing the advantages 
this aircraft brings to the fight, the following discussion should be considered biased in 
nature.  
As the authors progressed through this project, three common themes seemed to 
surface when involved in discussion with outside sources: 
• People are not talking to the right people.  The DoD is full of bright, 
motivated personnel, both civilian and military, who want to make a 
difference and provide the best product or service to the warfighter.  The 
problem, though, is the inherent bureaucracy of the DoD, which functions 
as a barrier to discovering the critical links necessary to identify and solve 
problems. 
• Management personnel outside of the operational forces generally have a 
working knowledge of PBL.  However, at the operational level there 
seems to be a lack of training and understanding of what PBL entails, let 
alone what information decision makers need to make the right choice for 
PBL candidate selection.  Drawing from past experiences where the focus 
was on mission capable airplanes and chasing the parts required to 
maintain those airframes, having the understanding that the answer to 
those issues is not just in inventory levels, but also on reliability of the 
airframes and their components could have resulted in a greater 
contribution to the operational readiness of the AH-1W today.   
• PBL culture does not exist within DoD at the broader spectrum that is 
required to successfully introduce PBL to a program.  In the authors’ 
opinion, inventory/maintenance managers focus too much on meeting 
demand and forecasting future requirements based on previous demand 
instead of discovering other solutions (i.e., reliability).  Questions should 
be posed as to why these parts are failing as opposed to how to obtain 
more of these parts. Despite the direction from Congress to utilize PBL as 
the primary contracting tool for DoD acquisitions and programs, the 
culture of DoD is slower to shift from obtaining higher inventory levels to 
mitigate part shortages to focusing on reliability/maintainability of the  
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components to improve operational availability. In order for 
inventory/maintenance managers to enter into the PBL mindset, they need 
proper training and education.   
B. PROJECT SUMMARY 
The purpose of this study was to provide a background of the H-1 program and 
performance based logistics and to ultimately find a methodology that would enable 
contracting personnel to select and analyze components that are good candidates for PBL 
contracts within the H-1 program. 
The H-1 community has existed since the Vietnam era and the latest upgrade 
contract was issued in 1996.  Currently, DoD has a PBL contract with Bell Helicopter 
Textron, Inc.  PBL contracts are the preferred method of acquisition within DoD and 
currently there are PBL contracts on eleven families containing twenty-one NSNs.  
However, there is no standard methodology used to select and analyze components which 
are to be used in PBL contracts. 
In order to determine which component was a good candidate for further 
exploration, the authors gathered data from NAVICP Philadelphia including reports 
listing the top ten NMC components.  The authors then looked at the NMCM, NMCS, 
DMMH, BCM, CANN and Support Cost categories to select the component for further 
evaluation.  The component selected was the dual hydraulic actuator. 
The authors used reports listing the removal hours on each of the dual hydraulic 
actuators.  The data was entered into a Crystal Ball model.  This model used the actual 
data to forecast the removal time for 10,000 of these parts.  Using the results from this 
model, in conjunction with knowledge and experience about the aircraft and this 
component, the authors were able to make conclusions regarding the dual hydraulic 
actuator and whether or not it is a good candidate for a PBL contract. 
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C. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Analysis Supports Non-critical Pre-mature Failure of the Dual 
Hydraulic Actuator in Comparison to its Life Expectancy   
Using the forecasts from the Crystal Ball model, the authors conclude that the 
dual hydraulic actuator may not perform at its expected level.  Less than 5% of the parts 
are forecasted to remain functional until the 2200-hour forced removal threshold.  In 
addition, the average removal time of the component is 790 hours.  Based on their 
assumptions and while considering the limitations the data presented, in the authors’ 
opinion it is still reasonably safe to assume that there are reliability issues with the 
actuator that may be worth addressing though PBL means.   
2. PBL Contracts are an Appropriate Tool to Use 
DoD has mandated the use of PBL contracts in situations where their use is 
appropriate and applicable.  For the H-1 program, specifically the dual hydraulic actuator 
for the AH-1W, a PBL contract written with an acceptable reliability requirement and 
streamlined support structure, whether via IMA or contractor support, can reduce 
downtime and increase operational availability.    
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The Dual Hydraulic Actuator Should be Considered a Candidate for 
a PBL Contract 
After looking at the data provided by the Crystal Ball model, the authors 
recommend that the dual hydraulic actuator be awarded a PBL contract.  At this point, 
there is a need to increase reliability, which in turn will have an impact on the operational 
availability of the AH-1W.  However, the system-level impact is difficult to measure and 
it is important to note that focusing on the reliability of one component such as the dual 
hydraulic actuator is not the end-all solution to increased Ao.   
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2. Data Analysis Should Include Alternative Analytical Tools in the 
Absence of Access or Understanding of Crystal Ball  
Crystal Ball is an extremely useful tool and provided adequate forecasts for the 
purpose of this study.  In addition to Crystal Ball, there are other tools available such as 
software from Real Options Valuation that can be used to create a similar and/or more 
sophisticated model than was created with Crystal Ball.  However, even without these 
tools, it seems clear from the results that some sort of analysis of the variance in (or 
distribution of) part reliability, and not just an analysis of the mean time to failure, should 
be incorporated into PBL candidate review. 
3. Increase PBL Training Opportunities 
While PBL is the DoD’s preferred method of contracting, it appears that there is 
limited, if any, training for those individuals who are using this tool.  In the authors’ 
opinion, successful PBL implementation relies on the integration of technical expertise 
from fleet operators and maintainers of these systems.  PBL training must also reach out 
to acquisition personnel to be more readily prepared to recognize the potential benefits a 
PBL contract/arrangement could bring to the war-fighter.   
E. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. Conduct Similar Study Using Gathered Data from the H-1 Reliability 
Centered Maintenance (RCM) Program via L-3 Communications 
The authors were unaware a RCM program existed for the H-1 program until the 
very end of their project.  The RCM program has what they call “over the shoulder” data 
collection on reliability of components.  While gathering data, the authors made 
assumptions regarding the data provided.  Fewer assumptions would be necessary if the 
data being analyzed came from the RCM program before their information was sent 
directly to engineers when reliability issues are identified.  A research project working 
hand and hand with this entity may result in a better streamlined process to follow for 
PBL candidate selection.      
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2. Research Other Components 
The authors only looked at one component, the dual hydraulic actuator, in this 
study.  However, using the methodology presented in this study, other components 
should be looked at to determine if they are also good candidates for PBL contracts.  
3. Determine the Best Metrics to Use in These PBL Contracts 
Although the authors looked at benchmarking to generate themes and ideas for 
metrics in the PBL contract, exact metrics are needed. In addition to the traditional PBL 
metrics, the authors propose that their metrics related to readiness and risk, as discussed 
in Chapter IV (Data Analysis), be added to the evaluation process of PBL contracts.  The 
contract needs to incentivize the contractor for the appropriate metrics.  In order to do 
this, research is needed to determine the cause of the premature failure of this and other 
components belonging to the AH-1W or any DoD system. 
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